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A Model of Competition Between Online and Traditional Firms
Sivakumar Viswanathan
Information Systems Department, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University,
44, West 4th Street, NY, NY-10012. {sviswana@stern.nyu.edu; fax-212-995-4228}
retailing. Gap.com, eSchwab, JCPenney.com, WalMart.com and Barnesandnoble.com were among the
hybrid firms that made the grade.

Abstract
This paper attempts to model the strategic interaction
between firms in online and traditional markets. It
analyzes how each market affects the competitive
characteristics of the other. Existing research on
electronic markets has focused largely on their welfareenhancing features. However, electronic markets coexist
with traditional markets with each strongly influencing
the other. Results show that the profits of firms in
competing channels increase as they differentiate
themselves as much as possible from each other, and by
differentiating themselves based on the characteristics
over which consumers have the maximum variety in
relative valuations. The choice of the factors of
differentiation, however, is crucial, as are the relative
sizes of the online and offline markets. The results also
indicate that neglecting the impact of traditional markets
on online firms risks oversimplification, and might lead to
incorrect prescriptions to both offline and online firms.

One of the serious challenges faced by traditional
firms moving online is the issue of integrating their online
strategies with their traditional operations. Since online
markets are characterized by severe price competition,
traditional firms that move online are forced to match
their competitors’ prices, and this can conflict with their
pricing strategies offline. As illustrated by the quote
above, Charles Schwab was forced to adopt the same
pricing strategy both online and off. Wal-Mart, Home
Depot, Electronics Boutique and Circuit City are
examples of some other firms that have streamlined their
traditional operations to be in sync with their online
operations.
With more and more traditional firms moving online,
Web-based markets and traditional markets are no longer
isolated but strongly influence one another. The fact that
online markets coexist with and compete with firms in
traditional markets has been largely overlooked in the
research literature. Most of the existing research on
electronic commerce (for instance, see Bakos,1997,
Brynjolfsson and Smith,1999; Bakos et al.,1999) that has
focused on studying the efficiency of electronic markets,
has neglected this strategic interaction between firms
operating in the two domains.

1. Motivation and Research Questions
“As demand for eSchwab’s $29.95 online trades was
booming beyond expectations, customers with Charles
Schwab’s traditional brokerage still had to pay an
average of $65 per trade. The two-tiered pricing was
awkward. Soon Schwab decided to price all trades at
$29.95, thus adopting the same pricing strategy both
online and off.” - “Internet Defense Strategy- Cannibalize
Yourself”, Fortune, Sep., 1999.

This research seeks to address this issue by analyzing
the impact of Internet retailing on traditional brick-andmortar firms. More specifically, it seeks to examine how
the strategic interaction between online, traditional as well
as hybrid firms which have a presence in both markets,
impact competitive outcomes in both markets. The
differences between online and traditional channels,
makes this issue more interesting. A spatial differentiation
model (Hotelling 1929, Salop 1979) is constructed to
examine the impact of the interactions between these two
markets. The features of the equilibrium configurations
and its sensitivity to various parameters are also analyzed.
Finally, the welfare implications of this model are
compared with the benchmark case where the online
markets are independent of traditional markets.

Online retailing has been growing rapidly, and is
soon predicted to account for a significant portion of the
overall retail revenues. Given the explosive growth of
online markets, there have been claims that Internet
retailing would displace traditional firms and markets in
several sectors. As a retailing channel, the Web differs
significantly from traditional channels in several ways. It
offers convenient access, wider variety, and ease of
search/comparison. Consumers who value such features
prefer shopping online. However, a large number of
consumers prefer shopping via traditional channels.
Overall, therefore, a more realistic scenario is one where
both online and traditional firms co-exist, competing
either for an overlapping set of consumers, or serving
orthogonal segments. With more and more traditional
firms beginning to realize the potential of online retailing,
there has been a surge in the number of hybrid firms
operating in both domains. According to recent surveys
by Media Metrix and Nielsen, the lists of 50 top online
retailing sites read like a Who's Who of land-based

2. A Model of Competition between Online
and Offline Firms
In this model the online and traditional markets are
each represented by a unit circle. There are three types of
firms – pure online firms located wholly online,
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only from firms in their market. The hybrid firm prices
identically in both markets. These constraints are later
relaxed to examine the implications of consumers
switching across markets, as well as the implications of
the hybrid firm being able to price discriminate across
markets.

traditional ‘brick-and-mortar’ firms located wholly
offline, and hybrid firms with presence in both markets.
Each firm i sells a commodity product and charges a price
pi. While the products themselves are commodities, the
firms innovate on features of the buying experience
associated with the products. Examples of such features
include product comparison and evaluation information,
pre-purchase help and support (perhaps from a live
salesperson), product layout in the store, ease of purchase
(for instance, one-click ordering), immediacy of delivery,
customer service and after-sale support. It is precisely
these channel-related features, and aspects of the buying
experience that separates competing online and traditional
firms (Steinfield and Whitten, 1999).

At equilibrium the firms locate opposite each other in
the unit circle and each firm’s price takes into
consideration the price of the other firm (firm h) in its
market. However, the hybrid firm, by virtue of being
present in both markets, takes into consideration the
prices of firms in both markets in choosing its price. The
hybrid firm always prices between the prices of the pure
online firm and the brick-and-mortar firm. Also, the firm
in the market with the higher misfit costs, prices the
highest, while the firm in the market with the lower misfit
costs prices the lowest of the three (see figure 1). As
consumers’ disutility from buying a product other than
their ideal one, increases, firms are able to charge a higher
price. However, in the market in which consumers find
the two firm’s products to be relatively close substitutes
(i.e., the market with lower misfit costs), the firms are
forced to maintain lower prices.

Consumers are utility-maximizers and each consumer
is in the market for one unit of a product in each period.
Consumers have single-peaked preferences over the
heterogeneous features of the channel. For instance, some
consumers may want to ‘feel’ the product prior to
purchase, and have a salesperson inform them about
relative product characteristics, while others may prefer
browsing and studying products themselves on the Web.
Thus, each consumer has an ideal configuration of
channel-related features (for instance, active salesperson
involvement, immediate delivery and a three-year
warranty) that gives her the highest utility and the
consumer incurs a loss of utility when she buys from a
firm other than her ideal one. This is referred to as the
misfit cost.

Figure 1 illustrates the impact of varying parameters
(misfit costs in market A) on firm prices. As consumers in
market A become more sensitive to the channel-related
differences and suffer a greater loss of utility from
mismatch, both the firms in that market (firm a as well as
the hybrid firm) have an incentive to raise prices.
However, the hybrid firm by virtue of being present both
online as well as offline, is more sensitive to the
competitive conditions in its other market as well and
hence is limited by the characteristics of that market. Thus
although the hybrid firm would rather price higher in the
less competitive market, it has to take into consideration
the competition in its other market (market B) in setting
its price. As illustrated in figure 1, a firm (firm b) wholly
inside one market is forced to react to changes in the
competitive conditions in the other market despite no
direct changes in the features of its own market (market
B).

Consumers are uniformly distributed on each unit
circle according to the position of the peak of their utility
functions. Seller choices of channel-related features are
differentiated along the same dimension. Consumers are
assumed to have a high reservation price ř, relative to
their total costs, which ensures that all firms are in direct
competition and that all consumers in the market buy a
differentiated product (Economides, 1989). Given the
utility functions, the problem of utility maximization for
consumers is equivalent to cost minimization where the
costs to the consumer includes the price that she pays for
her product added to the misfit cost. Firms choose
strategies that maximize their profits and each firm
decides the choice of its location and price, given the
location and price of the other firms in its market. Firms
play a two-stage game, with firms simultaneously
choosing locations in the first stage followed by a
simultaneous choice of prices in the second stage. The
equilibrium for the two-stage game in prices and locations
are derived.

Thus, despite the fact that the pure online and the
traditional firms do not compete for the same set of
consumers, the presence of the hybrid firm reacting to
competitive conditions in both the markets, introduces
strategic interdependence between these two firms. The
relative sizes of the two markets (as indicated by the
number of consumers in each market - na, nb) also affects
the prices and profits of the firms in each market. As the
online market grows in size relative to the traditional
market, the online market begins to gain more importance
and has a greater influence on the prices of the hybrid and
online firm.

3. Analysis and Discussion
This sections analyzes the simplest case where there
is one firm of each type in each market – firm a, in market
A, firm b, in market B, and firm h, the hybrid firm. The
initial model assumes that consumers are either online or
offline and consumers in each market purchase products

Base Case - To examine the impact of the presence of the
hybrid firm in both markets, this is compared with the
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firm alters the competitive characteristics of the two
markets at equilibrium. As illustrated in figure 1, when
the markets are completely independent, the firms have an
incentive to charge a higher price and thereby lowering
net consumer welfare.

base case where there is no ‘hybrid’ firm and the two
markets are independent of each other. This is identical to
the case where the hybrid firm is able to price
discriminate across markets. Comparison with the base
case helps us understand how the presence of the hybrid
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channel preferences, offline firms may well be best
served by specializing in, and highlighting their realworld strengths, rather than a hybrid online-offline
strategy.
• However, when online markets are growing relative to
offline markets, traditional firms may benefit by
moving online and adopting a hybrid strategy.
• Neglecting the interdependence between online and
traditional markets and the role of the hybrid firms
provides a misleading picture and may lead to
overestimating the efficiency and welfare-enhancing
properties of online markets.

Overlapping Markets – It was initially assumed that
consumers in each market purchase only from firms in
their own market. However, as acknowledged earlier
online markets and offline markets increasingly compete
for the same set of consumers in many segments and
consumers may access both markets. In other words, as
the degree of overlap between the two markets increase,
consumers in one market have increasing access to firms
in the other market. As consumers from one market
purchase products from the other market, they face a
switching cost. In the limit, when the switching costs for
consumers is zero, i.e., when the two markets completely
overlap, all the firms charge the same price. This price is
the same as the price charged by the hybrid firm when the
two markets are interdependent (see figure 1).

Future extensions include incorporating other
pertinent differences between online and traditional
markets, such as search costs and network externalities,
and analyzing the impact of additional hybrid firms on the
equilibrium characteristics of the model.

4. Conclusion and Further Extensions
The results indicate that the prices and the total
profits for all three firms are the highest when the two
markets are completely independent and the prices and
total profits are the lowest when the two markets overlap
completely. The prices and the total profits for all firms,
when the markets exhibit strategic interdependence due to
the presence of the hybrid firm, fall in between these two
extremes. In summary,
• The efficiency and competitive characteristics of online
markets are significantly altered due to competition
from traditional and hybrid firms.
• When online markets are more competitive than
traditional markets and consumers differ in their
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